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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
RIVERA v. STATE: A CORAM NOBIS PETITION, RESTING 
ON A PROBATION BEFORE JUDGMENT, WHERE 
DEPORTATION IS A POTENTIAL COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCE, MAY BE DENIED IF THE GUILTY PLEA 
WAS MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY, IN 
SATISFACTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS. 
By: K. Alice Young 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, although standing for a coram nobis petition may rest on probation before judgment 
when deportation is a potential collateral consequence, the court may 
deny relief if the plea otherwise satisfies the demands of the Maryland 
Rules. Rivera v. State, 409 Md. 176, 973 A.2d 218 (2009). 
Specifically, when the record illustrates a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea, the coram nobis court may deny relief without looking 
beyond the record to the assurances relied on by the defendant in 
making his plea. !d. at 195-96,973 A.2d at 230. 
The State arrested Juan Rivera ("Rivera") during divorce 
proceedings after his wife alleged that he committed child sexual 
abuse. The State presented evidence that Rivera engaged in anal 
intercourse with his daughter. Rivera admitted to becoming aroused 
on one occasion when his daughter was in her parents' bed, but denied 
any other sexual behavior toward his daughter. The State charged 
Rivera, a citizen of Peru and a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States, with child abuse, second-degree sexual offense, and third-
degree sexual offense. Rivera and the State negotiated a guilty plea. 
Mary Herdman ("Herdman"), Assistant State's Attorney for 
Montgomery County, wrote a letter to Rivera's counsel, in which she 
acknowledged Rivera's concerns and addressed his deportation risks. 
According to Herdman's letter, a Special Agent for Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") verified that ICE would not "look 
behind" the charge of "contributing to acts, omissions, or conditions 
rendering a child in need of assistance" for deportation purposes. 
Relying on these specific assurances in Herdman's letter, Rivera 
pleaded guilty to that charge on January 24, 2005, in the Circuit Court 
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for Montgomery County, and was subsequently sentenced to 360 days 
incarceration and two years of supervised probation. 
Rivera filed a timely motion to reconsider his sentence. The 
sentencing modification court struck his guilty plea and entered a 
probation before judgment on January 16, 2007. Within three months, 
ICE arrested Rivera, who then petitioned for coram nobis relief. 
The coram nobis court denied Rivera's petition on the merits, and 
alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the denial of coram nobis on the merits, but 
disagreed with the lower court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
grant the petition. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Rivera's 
petition for writ of certiorari and the State's conditional cross-petition 
for certiorari on the jurisdiction issue. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed the threshold 
jurisdictional issue. Rivera, 409 Md. at 191-92, 973 A.2d at 227-28. 
A petitioner for coram nobis relief seeks to correct a fundamental or 
constitutional error in his conviction, particularly when facing a 
significant collateral consequence from the conviction. I d. at 190-91, 
973 A.2d at 227 (citing Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 75, 760 A.2d 647, 
659 (2000)). Relying on precedent, the court explained that a 
probation before judgment can be considered a conviction for coram 
nobis purposes, when supported by the circumstances of the case. I d. 
at 191-92, 973 A.2d at 228. The court reasoned that eligibility for 
coram nobis relief rests not on the method of sentencing, but on the 
consequences that arise from the conviction itself. !d. at 192, 973 
A.2d at 228 (quoting Abrams v. State, 176 Md. App. 600, 616-17, 933 
A.2d 887, 897 (2007)). 
Relying on this rationale, the court considered the critical issue of 
whether Rivera's conviction itself would result in significant collateral 
consequences, notwithstanding the form of sentencing. !d. at 192-93, 
973 A.2d at 228-29. In 2000, the court held that deportation 
proceedings are a significant collateral consequence of a conviction, 
thereby critically expanding the availability of coram nobis relief in 
Maryland. !d. at 193, 973 A.2d at 229 (citing Skok, 361 Md. at 77, 
760 A.2d at 660-61). Therefore, the court explained, Rivera's 
probation before judgment allowed standing for coram nobis relief, 
because even that sentence put him at risk for deportation. Rivera, 409 
Md. at 193, 973 A.2d at 229. 
The court then analyzed whether the colloquy on the record 
supported Rivera's voluntary entry into the guilty plea. ld. at 195, 973 
A.2d at 230. Rivera contended that he pleaded guilty based on the 
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State's Attorney's written assurance that ICE would not use the lesser 
charge as a foundation for deportation proceedings. /d. Prior to the 
plea colloquy, Rivera's counsel requested that the court seal and 
incorporate into the court file the plea negotiation documents. /d. at 
181, 973 A.2d at 221. Rivera's counsel noted that the referenced 
documents related to Rivera's potential immigration consequences. 
/d. at 181, 973 A.2d at 221-22. Rivera's plea colloquy immediately 
thereafter included questions about his understanding of the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea. /d. at 193-94, 973 A.2d at 
229. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Rivera's plea colloquy 
comported with Maryland Rule 4-242(e) because the plea judge 
informed Rivera about the possibility of immigration consequences. 
Rivera, 409 Md. at 194, 973 A.2d at 229. The court reasoned that, 
despite Rivera's reliance on assurances from ICE in Herdman's 
correspondence, the letter did not provide Rivera a guarantee against 
deportation. /d. at 195-96, 973 A.2d at 230. The court determined 
that Rivera pleaded guilty voluntarily and that, although neither the 
State nor Rivera expected his deportation, the record failed to validate 
his reliance on Herdman's letter as a guarantee. /d. 
Finally, the court analyzed the denial of coram nobis relief based 
on the sufficient factual foundation for Rivera's knowing entry into his 
guilty plea. !d. at 194-95, 973 A.2d at 229-30. Rivera contended that 
his guilty plea was unknowing and fundamentally flawed because the 
charge to which he pleaded guilty was not substantiated by the facts to 
which he averred. /d. at 187, 973 A.2d at 225. In Maryland, a court 
may accept a guilty plea after an examination of the defendant in a 
colloquy on the record, conducted either by the court, the State's 
Attorney, or the defendant's attorney. /d. at 195, 973 A.2d at 230 
(quoting Md. Rule 4-242(c)). The court reasoned that a court derives 
the factual support underlying a guilty plea from either the defendant's 
testimony or opposing allegations. Rivera, 409 Md. at 194-95, 973 
A.2d at 229-30 (citing Methany v. State, 359 Md. 576, 601, 755 A.2d 
1088, 1103 (2000)). The court held that the statement of facts 
proffered by the State, which alleged that Rivera engaged in an act of 
anal intercourse with his daughter, sufficiently supported Rivera's 
knowing guilty plea. /d. at 195-96, 973 A.2d at 230. 
Rivera emphasizes the need for defense counsel to critically view 
offers the State puts forth in order to obtain a guilty plea. A reviewing 
court may choose not to consider the assurances underlying a guilty 
plea as guarantees made by the State. Although Rivera preserves 
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coram nobis to protect defendants from collateral consequences, the 
ruling underscores the risk of relying on assurances put forth by the 
State to entice the defendant's plea. Maryland practitioners should 
take great care when counseling defendants who risk deportation as a 
collateral consequence of a conviction, because deportation can result 
even from a probation before judgment. Maryland practitioners 
should also ensure that the plea colloquy includes both a description of 
the State's assurances upon which the defendant bases his voluntary 
plea, and an acknowledgement by the court of the effect of those 
assurances. A thorough colloquy will create a record upon which the 
defendant may rely, in order to show the foundation for his knowing 
and voluntary plea. 
